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THE social significance of relative prices in traditional economic
theory is closely related to the efficiency of resource allocation in a
general equilibrium context. The heart of that relationship consists of
ensuring optimality in the Pareto sense through the interaction of
relative commodity and factor prices. Given production conditions and
consumer preferences, general equilibrium theory aims to show how
efficiency can be achieved in a market-oriented or capitalist system.
When a time dimension is added to the above we obtain the so-called
dynamic general equilibrium model in which relative prices once again
play an important role. The problem of resource allocation now takes
on intertemporal as well as horizontal dimensions. Besides relative
factor and commodity prices, we have an additional price to deal with,
namely, the rate of interest, which affects the crucial decisions as be-
tween consumption and saving. The central interest of traditional
theory remains: How does the market or capitalist system simulta-
neously bring about an efficient horizontal as well as intertemporal
allocation of resources.
Another extension of our static general equilibrium theory in which
relative prices play a prominent role is in the space dimension, usually
called international trade theory. Now flows between countries are
incli.ided and another relative price, the exchange rate, becomes rele-
vant. But the basic social problem remains the same, i.e., to ensure
maximum global efficiency, as both relative prices within countries and288 Roleof the Price Structure
exchange rates between them are adjusted to take maximum advantage
of the additional production opportunity called trade.
Thus the most important role of relative prices in the traditional
classical and neoclassical literature has been in the achievement of
efficient resource allocation extended to time and space. The relevance
for practical planning or policy making is relatively slight. In fact,
only one real policy conclusion can be drawn from the general equi-
librium model as extended, namely, to let the price system function as
freely as possible.
We know that the real world, even in the mature economies, does
not always meet the implicit conditions which permit the general equi-
librium system to operate to ensure Pareto optimality. Even if we
should accept the efficient utilization of resources as "the" major social
problem, certain essential conditions must be fulfilled if such a system
is to be at all relevant to a real society and if planning based upon it is
to make any sense. For one, we must assume the existence of a minimal
set of price- and profit-sensitive entrepreneurs or other economic agents.
For another, the society must be politically and ideologically ready to
accept the capitalist system as a driving force. In other words, the
relevance of the price system as an essential instrument to ensure
optimality requires that there exist no economic necessity, e.g., because
of scale or other reasons, for government to play a substantial role in
the economy's directly productive areas, and moreover, that there exist
no overriding noneconomic or ideological "necessity"to have the
public sector play a more extensive role. Thirdly, we must assume the
relatively full and free flow of information and resources, i.e., the ab-
sence of pronounced institutional constraints.
In the developing economy context, to which this paper is primarily
addressed, the existence of a sufficiently large number of entrepreneurs
sensitive to price and profit signals cannot be taken for granted. Sec-
ondly, there is customarily in evidence a shortage of those many social
and economic overheads painfully built up over the centuries and
taken for granted in what are now the mature economies. Moreover,
in many of these societies, especially in the early stages after emergence
from colonialism, there exist strong ideological reasons for not wanting
to accept a market-oriented system, which is often identified with
imperialism, as the driving force. Finally, neither the mobility ofRelative Prices in Economic Development Planning289
resources,nor the flow of information, nor the absence of other major
institutional constraints, can be taken for granted. In fact, perhaps
more than anything else, it is the absence of these features and the
consequent inability to use the convenient ceteris paribus assumptions
of traditional theory which lieat the heart of the development
problem.
Under these circumstances, it is legitimate to ask whether or not the
efficient utilization of available resources is, in fact, "the" major social
problem facing the developing society. As it emerges from a frequently
stagnant colonial agrarian situation, a developing country usually
demands a reallocation of resources and is almost bound to make some
use of prices and profits in helping to achieve that reallocation. The
role of relative prices in this context is, however, very different from
that envisioned in the dynamic general equilibrium system. While this
system may be valid in the long run, i.e., once an economy is approach-
ing economic maturity—with all the caveats we are familiar with even
in those contexts—it does not capture the essence of the problem of
development; consequently, the simple policy advice flowing from it
is not really relevant.
If resource allocation across time and space is not "the" problem of
major relevance for the developing economy, what is? Basically, it is
the achievement of structural change via a broadening of the resources
base, both human and material. The basic question, in other words, is
not how to allocate given resources more efficiently, but how to intro-
duce technological change, how to broaden participation, how to create
entrepreneurs, how to create institutional change, and how to induce
minimum mobility. If these issues lie at the heart of the problem, and
if they can be addressed with the help of planning and policy making,
relative prices can be viewed as taking on a new and quite different
role. It is this ràle to which this paper is addressed. In section II, I de-
scribe the typical import substitution phase the newly independent
developing economy is likely to pass through initially. In section HI,
Iseek to outline the dimensions of the required transition from import
to export substitution and the role of relative prices in planning for
that transition. Finally, in section IV, this role is illustrated for the
case of Korea and Pakistan.290 Roleof the Price Structure
II
In traditional theory. relative prices provide the information and ,the
signals required for efficient static allocation as well as for moving the
economy in the right direction dynamically. Prices serve as stimulants
and propellants, but they cannot be expected, in any simple fashion,
to help create the proper environment, or entrepreneurial capacity, ab
initio. If there exists a shortage of entrepreneurs in a developing coun-
try, or if there exists the impediment of institutional barriers, planners
or policy makers may well set shadow prices in such a way as to provide
larger than normal profits to offset larger than normal risks. Over time,
once such decision makers, given the benefit of experience, begin to
improve at their task, and once institutions are gradually transformed
in directions which accommodate rather than obstruct change, these
extra price margins can be reduced and finally eliminated.
This idea is not a new and startling one, but it lies at the base of the
infant-industry argument. It is essentially what Smith and List were
talking about when they recognized the need for government interven-
tion to affect relative prices in behalf of new industries. The infant-
industry entrepreneurial argument is but another way of stating the
same case—for the use of administered distortions in relative prices to
permit learning-by-doing processes. to assert themselves.
Newly independent governments with developing economies have,
almost without exception, tried to replace traditional colonial patterns
of production and trade—orchestrated mainly by the commercial inter-
ests of the mother country—by interposing themselves and taking direct
action in the import-substituting direction. Typically, they first move
to gain full control of the critical raw material export flows in order to
prevent continued reinvestment of these flows for the exclusive benefit
of that same sector, or for repatriation abroad—and to channel them
into the domestic industrial and service sectors. Typically also, they
see the world through early Prebisch eyes, as an unequal partnership
between Center and Periphery, with anticipation of unfavorable
demand patterns for traditional exports, coupled with a firm belief in
the dynamic learning processes associated with import substitution. In
virtually all cases, this leads to more or less clear notions of what the
government must do directly and what it can induce or order the pri-
vate sector to undertake.Relative Prices in Economic Development Planning291
Mostimport substitution efforts reflect a consensus that government
must provide social and economic overheads, but there is much less
consensus concerning the ideal division of labor between the public
and private sectors in the directly productive sphere and least of all on
how to organize or cajole what remains in the private sector. Here, of
course, we have a wide range of choice, almost a continuous spectrum,
between direct government ownership, on the one extreme, and some-
thing approaching textbook laissez faire, on the other. Most developing
societies have, in fact, partly for economic and partly for ideological
reasons, opted for a relatively expansive definition of what should be
in the public sector—as well as for substantial direct controls over the
private sector. The tools most frequently used are exchange controls,
the compulsory surrender of foreign exchange, and the allocation of
import licenses to socially desirable projects in overheads and industry.
This import substitution syndrome usually includes substantial gov-
ernment deficit financing accompanied by inflation and an increasingly
overvalued exchange rate. Quantitative restrictions are preferred over
tariffs, credit rationing at low interest rates over an approach to market
allocation at higher interest rates, and the rationing of any critical
materials, like cement, over excise taxes. In fact, the policy choice can
often be characterized as one of trying to displace markets rather than
attempting to work through them.
The system described obviously provides windfall profits for im-
porters and tends to discriminate against exports, since a local pro-
ducer can acquire more local currency by saving a dollar of imports
than by earning a dollar of exports.
A second major concomitant of this distortion of relative prices
consists, very often, of the neglect of agriculture. Typically this sector,
instead of becoming a major propellant of overall development, turns
out'to be. a drag, incapable of even keeping up with population growth,
not to speak of freeing workers and providing savings for industrial
growth. Food shortages consequently frequently inhibit further indus-
trial growth as industrial wages tend to rise prematurely.
Thirdly, in the market for capital, the administratively controlled
interest rate usually is far below the rate of return on investment. In-
terest rates are often kept at these levels in less developed countries
(LDC's) mainly because it is believed that higher rates would dis-292 Roleof the Price Structure
courage investment, as well as for so-called equity reasons, i.e., to help
the small 'investor. Both arguments are defective. Most developing
countries chronically suffer from an excess of intended investment
relative to available savings; higher interest rates would not only im-
prove the allocation of a given amount of savings, but more impor-
tantly, increase the total volume of savings. On the equity issue, the
choice is really one between low interest rates which go to the favored
large-scale borrower, and high interest rates at which all borrowers,
large and small,' new and old, have approximately equal access at a
price.
The allocation of imports, of investment funds, for that matter of
virtually every scarce commodity, is thus likely to be.highly inefficient
during the import substitution phase, since administered prices drawn
up by bureaucrats are asked to bear the burden of determining output
as well as factor input mixes. The price of industrial goods is usually
pegged high relative to that of agricultural goods, not only via the
exchange rate, but also via taxes and subsidies intended to protect the
urban consumer; capital goods are often priced low relative to other
industrial goods both because imports are undervalued and because the
interest rate is kept artificially low. For all these reasons industrial pro-
duction is likely to be capital- and import-intensive, in spite of the
presence of surplus labor. Efficiency becomes irrelevant when receipt of
an import license or of a loan per se bestows a sizable windfall profit
and becomes a main objective of entrepreneurial activity.
The costs of maintaining this kind of system are patently large. Anne
Krueger estimated, for Turkey, that import-substituting industries used
20—75 lira to save a dollar of imports, while export industries required
8—14 lira to earn a dollar of exports.' Johnson, for Chile, estimated
that about 12 escudos were needed to save a dollar of imports at a time
when the official exchange rate was only 2 escudos per dollar.2 Stephen
Lewis estimated that Pakistani manufactures received about 40 per
cent more rupees per dollar than did agricultural goods in the early
Anne 0. Krueger, "Some Economic Costs of Exchange Control: The Turkish
Case," Journal of Political Economy, October 1966, Table 3, col. 5.
2 Lelland J. Johnson, "Problems of Import Substitution: The Chilean Automobile
Industry," Economic Development and Cultural Change, January 1967, p. 209.
S Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., "Effects of Trade Policy on Domestic Relative Prices:
Pakistan, 1951—1965," American Economic Review, March 1968, Table I.Relative Prices in Economic Development Planning293
Moreover,in spite of its high costs, import substitution as a way of
life may be difficult to abandon. .Industrial'importing interests become
ever more entrenched and ever more used to making large windfall
profits. The civil service enjoys not onlyabsolute power but also
its ability to supplement its income as sub rosa payments grease the
wheels of the disequilibrium system. Perhaps most importantly, any
change in policy must be prepared to run the gauntlet of accusations
of "giveaway" either to foreign or domestic private interests.
It should be remembered that this set of policies is basically 'a re-
action to the real or imagined lack of. indigenous industrial entre-
preneurship. But it will fulfill its historical mission and thus possibly
be worth the price only if the system can also be geared to a gradual
reduction of these controls over time. Otherwise, the self-fulfilling
prophecy of the "absent" entrepreneur forcing government into more
and more direct actions may.. well constitute the most vicious of the
many vicious circles we have heard about. In other words, the imposi-
tion of a hothouse industrial sector can- have the desired effect of
creating sufficient entrepreneurial capacity for use at a later stage only
if there are assured gradual reductions in the. temperature over time.
Only in this way will embryonic entrepreneurs h4ve a chance to divert
their energies from chasing slips of paper subverting the control
system to making some of the finer allocative decisions at the margin.
Only ii entrepreneurs become discouraged from trying to maintain
the hothouse indefinitely or using their influence with government to
have it maintained—and only if government in turn is willing to. recog-
nize the prohibitive costs of continued import substitution—can a
transition to a more efficient stage of development occur.
The use of relative prices in planning for such a transition relates
much less to the efficient allocation of known and given resoUrces, and
much more to uncovering additional resources and exploiting slacks in
the system. In other words, the conventional wisdom about the main
springs of growth undergoes gradual change. Emphasis must shift to
the broadening of the resource base, the attempt to bring the economy
closer to its full potential, mainly through the adoption of technologi-
cal change; and an adjustment of relative prices is likely to be essential
in effecting the necessary adjustments. While under the previous
regime public and large-scale private enterprise were the beneficiaries294 Roleof the Price Structure
in response to the actual or assumed shortage of domestic entrepreneur-
ship, a lowering of the hothouse temperature really requires a restruc-
turing of relative prices; that is to say, the role assigned to relative
prices, must increasingly be one of reflecting actual scarcities rather
than facilitating, in a very passive sense, government's directly
allocative actions. The goal must now become a broadening of the
development base in the attempt to harness a much larger proportion
of the previously disenfranchised economic agents to the development
effort. Especially if peasants and medium- and small-scale industrialists
are to be mobilized, this broadening cannot be done effectively either
by government ownership or by direct horizontal controls over re-
sources allocation in the private sector—if for no other reason than the
sheer impossibility of making all the millions of necessary decisions on
a broad front, and even physically reaching all the agents concerned.
Increasingly, therefore, as the economy moves out of its import substi-
tution subphase and into the next phase of development, the catalytic
role of government, through its influence on relative price signals,
rather than through its direct control of resources captured and allo-
cated, becomes the critical element.
III
The transition which a successful developing society must be prepared
to negotiate is from a land- or raw material—based import substitution
phase, as described above, to what may be called a labor and, later,
skill-based export substitution phase. The role of relative prices in
planning for such a transition is crucial, It can perhaps be best sum-
marized as promoting growth by undoing the artificial distortions while
preserving the gains of the earlier period. For example, distortions be-
tween the price of capital and of consumer goods may have led to
high saving and low capital formation, as in the case of Argentina, or
to relatively low saving and low capital formation, as in the case of
Pakistan. Substantive inefficiencies within the industrial sector, charac-
terized by high rates of excess capacity and capital intensity, result
from the overvaluation of the exchange rate and artificially low inter-
est rates. Stagnation in agriculture usually accompanies the artificial
depression of that sector's terms of trade in the effort to assist the indus-
trialization drive and keep vocal urban consumers under control.Relative Prices in Economic Development Planning295
Allthis is subject to change by tackling relative prices in the con-
text of development planning. The terms of trade between agriculture
and nonagriculture may be a prime objective. With agricultural activ-
ity still a preponderant feature of the landscape, the introduction of
technological change in that sector usually remains a prerequisite for
sustained growth—no matter how important the role of the foreign
sector. But while new knowledge on miracle seeds, fertilizer, and other
input combinations is clearly required for any major change in physical
relationships to take place, it is likely to be relative price adjustments
which are the sine qua non for the adoption of such new technology.
As long as, either because of an overvalued exchange rate or because
of forced procurement at artificially low prices, the farmer's terms of
trade are stacked against him, the potential bounty made available
through the courtesy of the International Rice Research Institute or
Mexican wheat researchers is not likely to be realized. This certainly
has been the comparative experience in India and Pakistan, where a
time-phased relationship between changes in agricultural price policy
and in the willingness to adopt the burgeoning new technology can be
established. Relative price adjustments can, of course, also be used on
the agricultural input side, especially when the new technology is
sensitive to the use of a new input, such as fertilizer. Sensible planning
which seeks to harness relative price changes for the promotion of
structural change and growth may well call for temporary subsidiza-
tionthat input, quite in addition to overall government support
of the output price as an underpinning of the market for major food
crops. Such relative price readjustments should, however, have time
limits, since one would clearly not wish to move away from one set of
distortions to perpetuate another. In other words, both on the input
and output side, the government, in its growth-promoting role of ad-
justing relative prices away from previous levels of distortions, should
be sensitive to the necessity, over time, of returning the economy as
quickly as possible to international prices, both in terms of the support
levels on major food crops and the restoration of input prices, such as
fertilizer, to competitive levels, after the period of introduction.
Perhaps the most important relative price which needs to be adjusted
during this transition period is, of course, the exchange rate, through
which an indirect tax is levied on exports while importer-industrialists2.6 Roleof the Price Structure
benefit .from incentive-dulling windfall profits. Devaluations, either
de facto or de juTe, have been a major tool of the restructuring that
began to take place in many of the developing countries during the
latter half of the 1960's, especially where such devaluations were ac-
companied by import liberalization, i.e., the partial dismantling of the
import quota and licensing. system, permitting a somewhat more mar-
ket-determined allocation of bottleneck inputs. As the economy tries to
move away from its almost exclusive reliance on traditional exports
and seeks to export more of its abundant labor power—and, somewhat
later, its indigenous skills—a more realistic exchange rate permitting
increased participation in the international economy becomes essential.
Similar comments apply to the relative price governing intertemporal
chOices between saving and consumption, i.e., the interest rate. In the
typical situation, with official rates way below the scarcity price of
capital, and a wide gap between it and unofficial curb rates, a move
toward unitary official rates at a considerably higher level is likely not
only to lead to a better allocation of investment, but also, and more
importantly, to a substantial rise in the volume of saving.
There are, in Other words, a large number of relative price adjust-
ments which, in the context of planning, can promote growth through
a restructuring effort. In order to determine, in any particular country,
what role to assign to the adjustment of which relative prices, and in
what sequence, we must have a dearer picture of the type of econ-
omy we are talking about and the phase of development it finds itself
in. For example, the growth promotion problem may not simply be
one of enhanced participation of all the factors; there may be special
problems of income or regional distribution which must be addressed
if a political explosion is to be avoided—a consideration also relevant to
growth. For another, the relative importance of the exchange rate is
much greater in the case of a small economy than of a large one, and
internal terms of trade much more crucial in the latter than in the
former. If an economy has a strong and diversified natural resources
base, with good expectations as to the future, the pressures for restruc-
turing from land- to development are much smaller. In
such cases, e.g., Malaysia, the attempt. may well be made to skip the
import substitution stage completely. And if the inherited human
resources endowment is strong, the required length of that phase mayRelative Prices in Economic Development Planning297
bemuch shorter. In other words, any sensible assessment of the role of
relative prices in planning cannot be independent of the type of econ-
omy we are talking about, e.g., its size, its land-labor ratio, its infra-
structure, and its relative strength of human and natural resources,
among others. Without an understanding ofthese elements as well as
some historical perspective on where the economy has been (during its
colonial period), and where it is now, the potential growth-prothoting
role of relative prices in planning cannot be fully realized.
The only really general that can •thus be made, in sum-
mary, is that there may exist a unique role for relative prices in pro-
moting growth via a planned restructuring of the developing economy's
system—long before the promotion of efficiency in the more familiar
general equilibrium context becomes relevant. Then, as distortions are
gradually eliminated, these readjustments in relative prices can be the
prime force in gradually.moving the economy out of import and into
export substitution, with the growth-promdting role of relative prices.
gradually yielding to the promotion of Pareto efficiency in,, the, fully•'
activated mature economy. This role of relative prices in the transition
process is illustrated by a brief loOk at a couple of actual cases, South
Korea and West Pakistan.
Iv
Atthe time of initial attempted transition to modern growth the small
dualistic economy of South Korea found itself with a fairly' strong
agricultural infrastructure and 'afairly well developed indigenous
entrepreneurial class. Nevertheless, in the aftermath 'of partition and
war, Korea in. the early 1950's turned toward a fairly cpnventional
import-substituting set of policies, tending to favor, industry and serv-
ices through foreign exchange' controls, with an increasingly over-
valued exchange rate as domestic inflation made itself felt; As long as
stabilization efforts are not successful and the economy continues to be
subject to rapid inflation and inflationary expectations—as was the
case in the 1950's and early 1960's—relative prices are unlikely to 'be
effective either as growth-promoting or finely allocative devices. When
such signals are obscured by massive overall inflation, and are
concentrated on making quick profits, rather than on productive in-
vestment, there is very little chance to. full benefits of import298 Roleof the Price Structure
substitution and move beyond it. During the period under discussion,
Korea's growth rate was just about high enough to keep up with popu-
lation growth, while saving rates were negligible—for some years, even
negative.
By 1963 the back of the inflation was finally broken and, given the
basically strong inherited human resource endowment, the first efforts
to attempt a developmental transition via changes in relative prices be-
came possible soon thereafter. In order to shift from what are essen-
tially land-based food and raw material exports to the exportation of
labor and, increasingly with time, domestic skills and ingenuity, Korea
first had to achieve a more realistic relative price of foreign exchange,
i.e., it could not,, especially since it is small, continue to live behind
artificial walls of protection without serious consequences for growth.
As a result, in May 1964, Korea substantially devalued her currency
and simultaneously unified a complicated multiple exchange system.
Moreover, imports were liberalized,i.e.,the licensing system was
broadened through the widening of import quotas, the introduction
of export retention schemes and, later, a quasi-automatic licensing
system to cover an expanding volume of imports. The effects of a
change in the signals via a change in this crucial relative price have
been startling. Exports, which had grown at annual rates of less than
15 per cent during the 1958—62 period, have been growing at annual
rates of 30 to 40 per cent since 1964. Moreover, this export boom has
been especially pronounced in light industry, where value added in the
form of pure labor could play an increasingly important role.
In 1965, relative prices in the sector complementary to the foreign
trade sector, i.e., the credit sector, were changed dramatically. Interest
rates, which had been kept at artificially low levels, were drastically
raised in 1965, and the huge gap between the low official rates, actually
available only to established prime borrowers, and the astronomically
high rates facing ordinary people on the curb market was substantially
narrowed. Interest rates on saving deposits doubled, and deposits
responded by rising by more than 200 per cent between 1964 and the
end of 1965, and by more than 700 per cent by September 1968. To
indicate that this was not just a shift from one form of saving to
another, we should .note that the Overall saving rate, which had been
negative in the 1958—62 period and had stood at only 5.8 per cent asRelative Prices in Economic Development Planning299
lateas 1962—64, reached 13.6 per cent in 1968 and is currently about
15 per cent.
It can be said that the changes in these two relative prices, the ex-
change rate and the interest rate, more than anything else, have led to
the spectacular turnaround in the performance of the Korean economy,
summarized in Table 1. As a direct consequence, Korea was placed
in a position to put her abundant high-quality human resources to
•use in an export-led rather than import-substitution-dominated indus.
trialization effort. Increasingly also, domestic skill and innovative
ingenuity could be incorporated with unskilled domestic labor as
medium- and small-scale entrepreneurs had an opportunity, really for
the first time, to gain access to resources and participate broadly in
the development process.
That other relative price, the terms of trade between agriculture and
industry, has not as yet in Korea been substantially modified from its
distorted earlier levels. It is true that, in 1968, the Korean government
adopted a price support policy which has tended somewhat to improve
the terms of trade of the agricultural sector. Unfortunately, however,
this price is announced at harvest rather than at planting time and
thus serves more as an income redistributive rather than incentive
device. Largely as a consequence, the adoption of better technology
including double cropping, fertilizer, and use, etc., has been slow,
and techniques for substantial agricultural productivity increases still
TABLE 1
Growth Performance of Korea, 1955—67
Per-
Years centage
Average annual rate of 1955—60 1.6
growth of real per 1960—65 3.7
capita income 1965—67 8.3
Domestic saving rate 1958 —2.5 .
1966 9.2
Average annual rate of 1955—60 —0.8
growth of exports 1965—67 39.3300 Roleof the. Price Structure
wait to be, harnessed. While maIly. of the distortions of the import sub-
stitution regime have, in other words, been corrected through changes
in relative prices, much yet needs to be done to activate the agricultural
sector.
Pakistan adopted a classic set of impPrt substitution policies soon
after partition and independence. While inflationary pressures built
up, rendering the exchaflge rate increasingly overvalued, the proceeds
of the traditional raw jute and cotton export trade, supplemented by
foreign aid, .were via exchange controls and licensing, to
the construction of overheads and industry in West Pakistan.
The overall economic performance which resulted throughout the
1950's was little of dismal. Agricultural production was barely
able to keep uiEiwith population growth; exports were. sluggish
throughout the decade, actually declining in value. Only large-scale
industry, much of it in the public sector, grew at a fast pace, i.e., in
excess of 30 perk cent annually. Domestic saving averaged around 5
per cent, and consequently, more than 50 per cent of the investment
expenditures of Five Year Plan (1955—60) had to be financed
from abroad.
In 1959 the first restructuring of relative prices was undertaken via
a de facto devaluation of the exchange rate through the establishment
of an export bonus system. This was followed by additional import
liberalization, including an expanding open general license, system
and a "free list.." By 1964 more than 40 per cent of imports was
liberalized in one way or Industrial excess capacity declined
from more than 50 per. cent in 1960 to 18 per cent of a much larger
industrial plant in 1965; Nontraditional exports rose by 89 per cent
between 1959 and 1964 and accounted for 60 per cent of the total by
1964.
In 1961, moreover, the policy of forced procurement of major food
crops at low prices was abandoned. Instead, prices were permitted to
be market-determined, undergirded by government-guaranteed mini-
mum price with fluctuations reduced through the operation
of buffer stocks. This. reform, supplemented by fertilizer subsidies,
constituted a marked irüprovement in agriculture's terms of trade. In
this fashion farmers' incentives were rçaligned, culminating in sub-
'stantial growth of agricultural productivity, especially in West Paki-Relative Prices in Economic Development Planning301
Stan,even before the new miracle seeds became generally available.
Once this more drastic change in input-output relations became
possible, especially in wheat, farmers were ready to respond and,
moreover, able to increase vital water inputs through the free importa-
tion of pig iron needed for the construction of tubewells. The realign-
ment of the terms of trade thus made the 32,000 private tubewells
which had mushroomed up by 1965 profitable, while readjustments in
the exchange system made them possible. Food grain production,
which had been growing at 1to 2 per cent annually during 1950—60,
spurted ahead at an annual clip of 4 per cent during 1960—65. By
1970—71 a wheat crop at 170 per cent of 1964—65 levels is expected;
and agricultural surpluses, rather than the persistent deficits of the
1950's, are being contemplated.
Moreover, the substantial increase in agricultural productivity and
the accompanying demand for pumps to power the tubewells led to
the surprising development of engineering and other smaller-scale
industries in West Pakistan. In this mutually self-reinforcing fashion,
agricultural surpluses financed the growth of decentralized medium-
and small-scale industries, many of which in turn provided the physical
inputs and incentives for further agricultural productivity increase.
Changes in crucial relative prices thus effected major growth-promot-
ing changes in the economy. The change in aggregate performance for
Pakistan, from negligible per capita income increases in the late
1950's to increases of better than 3 per cent annually on a sustained
basis, in spite of war, aid declines, and drought, amply testify that the
economy, in spite of its political problems, now seems to be moving on
entirely different tracks. This is illustrated in Table 2.
In summary, the role of relative prices in planning for the transition
from colonial agrarianism, through import substitution, to a more
market-oriented and broadly based growth effort is a central one. In
the typical situation, the attempt is made to achieve economic inde-
pendence by cutting the colonial pattern and capturing the land-based
resources for import-substituting industrialization; relative prices are
administered and largely irrelevant, with resources allocated directly
to what are considered socially desirable areas. Then, as the crazy quilt
of administered pricing and controls begins to take its toll in terms of
low efficiency and growth rates, structural change in the direction of a302 Roleof the Price Structure
TABLE 2
Growth Performance of Pakistan, 1955—67
Per-
Years centage
Average annual rate of 1955—60 1.2
growth of real per 1960—65 2.9
capita income 1965—67 3.4
Domestic saving rate 1958 5.5
].966 9.0
Average annual rate of 1955—60 2.5
growth of exports 1965—67 8.3
fuller participation of the society's peasants and medium- and small-
scale entrepreneurs is considered increasingly essential. Such a transi-
tion, in keeping with the changing entrepreneurial capacity of the
economy, requires major changes in relative prices. The ability to
transform the economy so that, first, unskilled labor, and then, domes-
tic ingenuity and skills can carry more and more of the essential bur-
dens of growth is heavily dependent on the timely, well-planned ad-
justment of relative prices.
COMMENT
RICHARD RUGGLES
In the first section of his paper, Ranis discusses the significance of
relative prices for the efficiency of resource allocation in the context
of general equilibrium theory. He emphasizes that the central interest
of traditional theory is in how the market or capitalist system simul-
taneously brings about an efficient horizontal and intertemporal alloca-
tion of resources. In this context relative prices include factor prices,
commodity prices, interest rates, and exchange rates.
Ranis recognizes that in order for market-determined prices to pro-
duce efficient resource allocation in a Pareto-optimal sense, certain
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wouldhave to be exclusively profit maximizers; there would have to
be full and freely available information; institutional constraints
would not exist; and there would have to be no overriding economic
or noneconomic reason for the government to play an extensive role.
Ranis argues that although in developed countries these conditions
may not be met, in developing economies their absence lies at the
heart of the development problem. The basic question is therefore
not how to obtain Pareto efficiency, but rather how to introduce tech-
nological change, broaden economic participation, create entrepre-
neurs, bring about institutional change, and induce mobility. This
then is the question which Ranis addresses.
Although Ranis is sympathetic with the problem, his description of
what developing countries actually do is quite the reverse. The im-
port-substitution syndrome and the expansive definition of the public
sector, he feels, result in a myriad of tools to accomplish their purpose.
Thus, exchange controls, foreign exchange allocation, import licences,
government deficit financing, inflation, overvalued exchange rates,
neglect of agriculture, control of the interest rate, and allocation of
investment funds are all part of the picture. The costs of maintaining
such a system are shown to be large in terms of the inefficiency of
import-substitution industries relative to export industries in Turkey,
Chile, and Pakistan. It is not at all clear from the discussion that
Ranis feels that the relative price distortions created by development
policies accomplish anything but an increase in costs and inefficiencies.
In fact, the main emphasis of the paper lies not on how relative prices
may be used to shape economic development, but rather on how
restoration of relative prices which reflect market conditions (both
domestic and international) results in healthy economic growth. The
final proof of the pudding, according to Ranis, is the examination of
the cases of South Korea and Pakistan, where evidence seems to show
that when more market-oriented prices were substituted for the crazy
quilt of administered prices and controls, broadly based growth could
take place.
From both a theoretical and empirical point of view the thesis
which is presented at first glance seems quite plausible. Ranis admits
that under conditions found in less developed countries relative prices
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he indicates, leads countries to adopt policies which distort the system
and are inefficient and costly to maintain. The only bright spot on the
horizon is that if such countries return to market-oriented prices,
virtue will be rewarded by increases in efficiency and growth.
What makes me uneasy about such a presentation is the implication
that although theoretically changes in relative prices can be used for
development purposes, at best this is true only in a very temporary
hothouse situation, and usually such interference is an impediment to
healthy economic development. It is almost as if Ranis is saying that
government interference with the market mechanism is inevitably
arbitrary, clumsy, and irrational, and that sticking to the market
mechanism is vastly superior. It is the unseen hand which best guides
our destiny, and what governments should do is to help facilitate the
market process rather than oppose or alter it for purposes of economic
development.
In many ways this is the council of despair. What the market system
produces we must like. By definition it is most efficient. Interference
with it will produce chaos. People are not masters of their own destiny
—the market system is. 1t is true that unwise decisions by governments
often create undesirable situations. On the other hand, undesirable
situations are also created by the market process. Extremes in income
distribution, inadeqaute housing, lack of education and sanitation,
and poverty all occur in market-oriented systems; their effects cannot
be overcome by strict adjustment of relative prices to market levels.
Specific policies which may interfere with relative prices must be de-
veloped.
The interest rate is a case in point. Ranis suggests that the rate of
interest affects the crucial decisions between consumption and saving,
and that higher interest rates not only improve the allocation of a
given amount of savings, but also, and more importantly, increase the
total volume of savings. In terms of equity, Ranis argues that the
choice is really one between low interest rates which channel available
savings to favored large-scale borrowers and high interest rates at
which all borrowers, large and small, new and old, have approximately
equal access at a price. It is true that higher interest rates do increase
the total volume of savings, but they accomplish this not so much byRelative Prices in Economic Development Planning305
affectingthe consumption-saving decision as by affecting the distribu-
tion of the income flow in the economy. Interest is not so much a
reward for current saving as it is a reward for having money. High
interest rates increase interest income, and interest income accrues to
the higher-income groups who are more likely to save it; they who
have get more. Increased saving thus occurs at the cost of increasing
the inequality of the income distribution. With respect to the alloca-
tion of investment funds, it is true that large and small, rich or poor
borrowers alike have equal access at a price, but the result, given the
price, is that investment funds are likely to be channeled into luxury
housing, office buildings, or other investments which have been made
profitable by the increase in income inequality and the affluence of the
financial community receiving higher interest rates.
In similar manner free and open trade may permit much of a coun-
try's foreign exchange to be used for luxury consumption or to flow
abroad. Merely because many governments make poor use of imports
does not mean that market-determined use would be optimal or even
superior to what some governments have done or are now doing.
The successes which Ranis cites might better be summed up by the
mottoes "devaluation is a good thing" and "agriculture needs stimula-
tion." The impact of devaluation, however, may not be through the
shift in relative prices nearly as much as through the income effect of
additional external demand and the shift from imports to domestic
production. Thus I would maintain that the marked improvement
which Ranis cites for Korea and Pakistan was primarily due to the in-
come effect of devaluation which increased the absolute level of
economic activity in the system, rather than to an increase in the
efficiency of resource allocation which might have resulted from rela-
tive price changes. With respect to agriculture the problem is some-
what more complex. Relatively higher prices may encourage agricul-
ture in some situations, but it may do so only at the cost of raising
food prices in urban centers. If agricultural response is slow because of
institutional or other factors, the price in real terms may be too high
for the system to pay, and other methods of raising agricultural output
may have to be tried.
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governments is justified in the name of development planning, but by
the same token I do feel that development planning will necessitate
rational departure from the relative prices which would occur if the
economic system were left to go its own way. In some instances market
solutions are appropriate; in others they result in distributions of in-
come or uses of resources which are not compatible with long-range
economic development goals. The argument that the primary criterion
in determining optimal relative prices should be efficiency of resource
allocation stated in terms of the marginal conditions is naive, because
it either ignores the fact that relative prices also determine the income
distribution or it assumes that the income distribution can be altered
without affecting the marginal conditions and thus the efficiency of
resource allocation. In practice it is often not possible or politically
feasible to alter an initial income distribution of an economic system
significantly, and it may be easier and more efficient to adopt relative
prices which may not be optimal in a resource allocation sense but
which will result in an initial distribution of income that will provide
greater welfare and be more socially acceptable. The role of the
economist in planning isto analyze the impact which alternative
policies can be expected to have on the economic system, rather than
just to indicate that the only role of the government should be to
facilitate the working' of the unseen hand.
PETER ECKSTEIN, Center for Research on Economic Development,
University of Michigan
The main thesis of the Ranis paper is that the development of a
newly independent economy should occur in two phases. (Mercifully,
he has abjured the term "stages.") The first is a "growth-promoting"
phase in which there is a "planned restructuring" of the economy
toward import substitution. Resource use is determined by direct gov-
ernment allocation or by administered prices that have been distorted
away from the levels that prevail in world markets or that would pro-
vide domestic market equilibrium. The second is an efficiency-promot-
ing phase in which relative prices are adjusted toward their equilibriumRelative Prices in Economic Development Planning307
levels,undoing the "artificial distortions" of the earlier phase and
shifting the economy toward export expansion.
I find myself able to agree with exactly 50 per cent of this argument,
fortunately the half that describes the direction in which most under-
developed economies should be moving today. Development economists
have been increasingly recognizing the need to go beyond the phase
of import-substituting industrialization,' and the Ranis paper is useful
in marshaling many of the arguments and in illustrating them with
two of the most persuasive case histories.2 The most important contri-
bution of the paper may be the suggestion from the Korean case that
saving rates can actually be increased by dismantling a system of con-
trols partly established for the purpose of stimulating
I find myself unable to accept even the qualified endorsement Ranis
bestows on the distorted-price phase: that it is "worth the price" but
"only if it is geared to a gradual reduction of controls over time." My
own position is that there is far less conflict than he implies between
the objective of basic growth and the objective of efficiency, and that
what conflict exists does not justify the kinds and magnitudes of price
distortions typically adopted to encourage import substitution.
1See,for example, Santiago Macario, "Protectionism and Industrialization in
Latin America," Economic Bulletin for Latin America, March 1964, pp. 61—101;
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (Raul Prebisch), Towards
a Dynamic Development Policy forLatinAmerica, New York, 1963, esp. pp. 6—8,
67—78;BelaBalässa, "Integration and Resource Allocation in Latin America," 1966,
mimeographed; John H. Power, "Industrialization in Pakistan: A Case of Frustrated
Take-Off," Pakistan Development Review, Summer 1963; Power, "Import Substitu-
tion as an Industrialization Strategy," Philippine Journal of Economics, Second
Semester, 1966, Pp. 167—204; and Henry J. Bruton, "Productivity Growth in Latin
America," American Economic Review, December 1967, pp. 1099—1116.
2Inour common zeal for the merits of a market system we should be careful not
to exaggerate. When Ranis tries to establish for Pakistan "a time-phased relationship
between changes in agricultural price policy and in the willingness to adopt the
burgeoning new technology" of the Green Revolution, I fear he risks crossing this
line. Mexican wheat and International Rice Research Institute rice were not intro-
duced into Pakistan on a commercial scale until 1965 and 1967, respectively. Growth
of acreage was spectacular, and improvements in market conditions undoubtedly
made the new varieties more attractive. However, the profitability of adoption
would have been high even without these improvements, and we cannot contrast
this fast adoption with some earlier period in which the technology was available
to Pakistani farmers but was not being applied. (For profitability figures, see Lester
R. Brown, Seeds of Change, New York, 1970, p. 42.)
3Itis not really clear, however, why "distortions between the price of capital and
of consumer goods may have led to high saving and low capital formation" in
Argentina but "to relatively low saving and low capital formation" in Pakistani308 Roleof the Price Structure
THE RELATIONSHIP OF PROBLEM AND POLICY
The Ranis paper offers three economic bases for a conflict between
growth and efficiency as an economy emerges from a state of de-
pendency—a lack of price-responsive entrepreneurs, a shortage of over-
head facilities, and the immobility of resources and information.4 The
policy implications of these deficiencies would seem to be straight-
forward. The "infant entrepreneurial argument" is one that favors
subsidizing and supporting entrepreneurshipin general—through
schools of business administration,specialtraining programs in
entrepreneurial skill and motivations, and the widespread availability
of business credit (raised, if necessary, through taxation) at equilibrium
interest rates. A lack of market information suggests that government
should supply it directly or encourage cooperation among competing
firms to seek it out. Resource immobility and deficient infrastructure
justify government action to subsidize or supply basic overheads in
transportation, communications, and education. What is striking, how-
ever, is the contrast between such neutral policies and the pricing and
allocation policies which Ranis defends as necessary to overcome the
4Raniscites a fourth, noneconomic justification for the system of distorted prices:
"strong ideological reasons for not wanting to accept a market-oriented system" and
for having "the public sector play a more extensive role." I do not think the
economist must mutely bow in deference to such "reasons." The ideologies in
question rarely seek ends which are unattainable through a fairly close adherence to
equilibrium prices; rather, they often introduce dogmatic misperceptions of the
relationship between means and ends. The job of the economist is not to take such
misperceptions as given, or to rationalize them into "necessities," but to point out
how ignoring opportunity costs can cripple the attainment of any set of economic
objectives and to devise less costly ways of translating ideology into policy. For
example, if the state must play "a more extensive role," the economist can make
the case that the entrepreneurial gap is wider and the expected social return to
investment is higher in the agricultural infrastructure than in automobile assembly.
The notion that adherence to ideologically prescribed means can itself be a source
of national welfare parallels the argument that no forms of habitual consumption
can be decried as "wasteful," since the individual's preference for them is itself an
indication of their utility. Veblen's reaction seems apt: "The question is... not
whether, under the existing circumstances of individual habit and social custom, a
given expenditure conduces to the particular consumer's. gratification or peace of
mind; but whether, aside from acquired tastes and from the canons of usage and
conventional decency, its result is a net gain in comfort or the fullness of life."
This way of posing the question is even more appropriate in examining development
policy, which can often gratify the politician or bureaucrat who calls the tune,
while detracting from the comfort of the taxpayer, worker, or consumer who must
pay the piper.Relative Prices in Economic Development Planning309
sameobstacles. He lists many of the typical elements of "the import
substitution syndrome": the undervaluing and rationing of foreign
exchange; tariffs and import controls that are more stringent for con-
sumer goods than for capital equipment; subsidized interest rates to
favored borrowers; price controls and rationing for some basic material
inputs; and measures to turn the internal terms of trade against agri-
culture. To this list we might add several more items: governn. mt in-
ducements for higher urban wages; the escalation of tariff structures
by degree of fabrication; the conferring of astronomical levels of effec-
tive protection; and a systematic tendency to underprice government
services and products.
The net effect of these distorted price and allocation policies is to
induce economic decisions which ignore the opportunity costs of re-
sources, as represented by world prices and domestic factor availabili-
ties.In •aneconomically arbitrary manner thesediscriminatory
policies favor the production of import substitutes over exports, of
manufactured goods over agricultural commodities, and of consumer
goods over capital goods;they stimulate so wide an array of industries
that few can attain an internationally competitive scale of production;
they encourage the use of imported inputs in the domestic assembly
of final goods; they favor capital-intensive techniques over labor-inten-
sive ones; and they create bottlenecks in the provision of overhead
services that provide neither guidance for the direction of further
expansion nor the means by which such expansion can be financed.°
Ranis accurately describes the costs of maintaining this system as
"patently large," so it should be abandoned once it has had time to
"do its job." The system he describes, however, is never well suited to
the job he has assigned it, is never accurately aimed at "the heart of
the development problem."
5Power("Industrialization," pp. 192—97) argues that the bias toward the pro-
duction of consumption goods itself entails a bias tOward consumption expenditure.
6Ranisat one point characterizes his early phase as one of "land- or raw
material—based import substitution" as against later phases of labor-based and
then skill-based "export substitution." If (as appears in the discussion of Korea) he
means to contrast the characteristic inputs to exports, this distinction seems useful.
The import-substitution process, however, isitself rarely "land or raw material"
intensive but, as he says elsewhere, typically "capital- and import-intensive," and
this defiance of the law of comparative advantage is a major source of its excessive
cost.310 Roleof the Price Structure
Governments do not need distorted prices to induce them to stimu-
late entrepreneurship, to provide information, or to undertake over-
head investments. Rather, increased supplies of entrepreneurship, in-
formation, and overhead capital can make their greatest contribution
to development only if they support directly productive activities that
are planned or established in close response to real opportunity costs
in the ..conomy. Many overhead services to production will realize that
contribution only if they are rationed by prices which reflect their
actual scarcities.
By contrast, the system of price distortions does "its job" by creating
"larger than normal" profit opportunities in some lines but not in
others. It stimulates entrepreneurship in automobile assembly but not
in fertilizer production; it creates flows of information about the
domestic market for tires made from iniported. rubber but not about
the world market for glass made from domestic silicates; it provides
railway lines to mammoth steel complexes but few dirt roads to village
craftsmen and vegetable growers; it provides transportation so cheap
that the mills can locate far from their sources of coal but close to their
sources of import
EFFICIENT AND INEFFICIENT GROWTH
The important contrast is not between growth and efficiency but be-
tween efficient growth and inefficient growth. Both theory and history
suggest that efficient growth in the early phase of economic independ-
ence is (1) faster, because it wastes fewer of the limited resources cur-
rently available in the economy; and (2) more sustainable, because it
saddles the future with fewer social structures that resist change and
fewer economic structures that have to be scrapped, subsidized, or
artificially supported.
As to the greater speed of efficient growth, the case histories of South
Korea and Pakistan are suggestive but not conclusive, since the period
of negligible per capita growth under distorted prices may—as Ranis
7See,for example, Edward S.Mason, Economic Development in India and
Pakistan, Cambridge, Mass., September 1966, pp. 8—9; Anne 0. Krueger, "Some
Economic Costs of Exchange Control: The Turkish Case," Journal of Political
Economy, October 1966; John A. King, Jr., "Colombia: Steel," Case 30 in Economic
Development Projects and Their Appraisal, Baltimore, 1967, pp. 505—27; and Alan
Carlin, "Indian Transportation: A Sectoral Approach to Development Constraints,"
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implies—havelaid some essential groundwork for rapid growth when
price distortions were finally reduced. Fortunately, there are many
examples of underdeveloped economies that have grown continuously
and rapidly in the postwar years in a single phase of broad participa-
tion in the world market—the Central American republics, the Ivory
Coast, Lebanon, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and, to a great
extent, Mexico and Peru.8 Both Dudley Seers and Barend de Vries
have provided cross-sectional evaluations of the strategy of inward-
directed growth through distorted prices, largely for the Latin Amer-
ican economies, and have shown that only the largest of these have
been able to maintain respectable .aggregate growth. Thus, the South
American pattern of development—what Prebisch has come to lament
as"industrialization in watertight compartments"—has not taken
Brazil, with a broad spectrum of resources and a sizable domestic mar-
ket, nearly so far from the exploitation of comparative advantage and
economies of scale as it has taken Paraguay and Uruguay.9 Estimates
of Chile's loss of current GNP through allocative distortions run from
2.5 per cent (Harberger) to 14 per cent (Balassa's upper limit).10
S The list includes none of the largest of the underdeveloped economies—not
because the policy of growth through trade at world prices has failed for them, but
because few (if any) have tried it. Reaching farther back into history, there are
many explanations of the remarkable development of Japan, but it seems difficult
to explain the pattern of that development without including the fact that for
most of the Meiji period Japan was forbidden by treaty from levying import duties
of more than 5 per cent ad valorem. (See, for example, W. W. Lockwood, The
EconomicDevelopment of Japan, Princeton, 1954, p. 539.) Individual enterprises
were established and temporarily subsidized by the governmçnt, but the main
thrust of "structural change" took place in the context of world prices.
9 Barend A. de Vries, "Importance of Size for the Orientation of Economic Policy,"
in David Krivine, ed., Fiscal and Monetary Problems in Developing States, New
York, 1967, pp. 309—23;andDudley Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development
of a Primary Producer in the Middle of the Twentieth Century," Economic Bulletin
of Ghana, 1963, pp. 57—69. This kind of reasoning and evidence tends to support
Ranis's assertion that "the relative importance of the exchange rate is much greater
in the case of a small economy than in that of a large one." Such assertions, how-
ever, should not overlook the effect of the distorted price policy in reducing the
import share of GNP but making it more strategic for the continued functioning
of the economy. The smaller tail is often more able to wag the dog. Witness, for
example, stories of Pakistani coal mines being forced to close temporarily for lack
of imported safety lamps, or 40 per cent of Indian tractors being out of commission
in 1966 for lack of imported spare parts. On the latter, see Brown, Seeds, p. 60.
loBalassa, "Integration," pp. 3—8. Arnold C. Harberger, "Using the Resources at
Hand More Effectively," American Economic Review, May 1958, pp. 134—55, Assume
these resources to have been saved rather than wasted. From an historical (but312 Roleof the Price Structure
Inefficient growth is less sustainable than efficient growth because
it achieves not only "a broadening of the resources base, both human
and material," but also embeds that base in structures that continue
to delay and inhibit the transition to a more efficient pattern of pro-
duction. On the human side, entrepreneurs trained at "chasing slips
of paper and subverting the control system" may bear no special quali-
fication for chasing customers in world markets or subverting the
mindless application of Western technology to domestic production.11
"Entrenched" industrial and bureaucratic interests may use all their
accumulated power to sabotage any tendency toward market rationing
at equilibrium prices.
There is little evidence that the distorted price system serves to
transform institutions "in directions which accommodate rather than
obstruct change." All too often the corollary of "structural change"
through distorted prices is structural resistance to restoring an efficient
pattern of production. Significantly, the dramatic decontrol measures
in South Korea and Pakistan were both decreed by strong governments
that were born in military coups and had secure power bases independ-
ent of the bureaucratic and industrial interests.12
On the material side, the most pernicious legacy of an inefficient
pattern of investment is not the abandoned cannery or the broad
highway reverting to jungle, widespread though such examples may be.
Such investments can be written off to experience while the economy
inefficient) Chilean capital.output ratio of 3.2, we can crudely calculate that the
growth rate could have been higher by 0.8 to 4.4 per Bruton, "Productivity,"
estimates "residuals" (annual growth rates of productivity) during the postwar period
which are respectable for Mexico (above 2 per Cent), low for Brazil and Colombia
(about 1½ per cent), negligible for Chile, and negative for Argentina.
1' Presumably the spectacular business success of Captain Gohar Ayub in Pakistan
over the period 1963—68—in automotive assembly, canning, and the distribution of
imported tractors—was not entirely due to the applicability of his military training
to entrepreneurship but bore some relationship to the fact that he was the son of
the president of the republic.
12 It might be unfair to apply to a normative "phase" theory one of Simon
Kuznets's requirements for a descriptive "stage" theory—that it identify "the major
processes in the preceding stage that complete it and, with the usual qualifications
for exogenous factors, make the next...stagehighly probable" ("Notes on the
Take-Off," in W. W. Rostow, ed., The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained
Growth, New York, 1963, p. 24). If, however, as Ranis implies, movement out of the
distorted-price phase is a requirement for its validity, then any useful normative
theory must establish that the impetus for the transition is sothething more en-
dogenous to the economy than the deus ex machina of a takeover by strong-willed
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goesforward into more promising lines of production. Nor is it the
government enterprise which, after a decade of operations, enjoys a
profit rate only half that of comparable private firms. Rather, the
heaviest burden on the future is created when inefficient enterprises
must have their operating costs subsidized directly by the government
(like the ubiquitous national airlines) or indirectly by the economy
(like the Pakistani industries which, well into the "efficient" phase of
economic development, were consuming raw materials worth more on
world markets than the final goods they were producing).13 An addi-
tional burden on the future results when new inefficient enterprises
are created primarily to justify an original inefficient enterprise by
providing its inputs (e.g., the parts for domestically assembled auto-
mobiles) or by purchasing its outputs (e.g., electricity or steel for which
there is inadequate domestic demand).'4 While the cases of direct sub-
sidization are more blatant and entail the extra cost of dissipating
scarce government revenues, the many forms of indirect subsidization
may ultimately do more to hamstring the growth potential• of the
economy.
CONCLUSION
I do not think we need to be so relative in our advocacy of economic
efficiency as Ranis implies. I think it is perfectly possible to devise a
13Whilethe extent of "negative value added" in Pakistan reported by Soligo and
Stern, based on highly indirect evidence, was probably exaggerated, more detailed
investigations still find examples of the phenomenon. Examples are not confined
toimport-substituting industries but spreadtothe export sector—e.g.,cotton
textiles i.n Pakistan, cocoa butter in Ghana—when export preferences are granted
to manufacturing but not to agriculture. (See, for example, Richard Mallon, "Export
Policy in Pakistan," Pakistan Development Review, Spring 1966, pp. 58—79; and
ElliotJ.Berg,"Structural Transformationvs.Gradualism:Recent Economic
Development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast," 1969, azographed.) Of more quanti-
tative importance may be the heavy outlays in domestic resources to save insignificant
—but positive—amounts of foreign exchange.
14Specificexamples of "linkages" used to subsidize inefficiency include the pro-
gressive "content-protection" regulations applied to automobile assembly in Latin
America; action of the colonial government of Uganda to subsidize an abortive
industrial estate near the site of the Owen Falls Dam; and tax exemptions granted
by the Colombian government to users of steel from the Paz del Rio mill. See, for
example, Leland L. Johnson, "Problems of Import Substitution: The Chilean
Automobile Industry," Economic Development and Cultural Change, January 1967,
pp. 202—16; Walter Elkan and Gail G. Wilison, "The Impact of the Owen Falls
Hydro-Electric Project on the Economy of Uganda," Journal of Development
Studies, July 1967, pp. 387—404; and Richard C. Porter, "The Effectiveness of Tax
Exemption in Colombia," 1969, multilithed.314 Role of the Price Structure
general defense of the equilibrium exchange rate as the basic device
for rationing' foreign exchange and an equilibrium interest rate as the
basic device for rationing capital and for price rationing in general
as opposed to quantitative restrictions. I think it is possible to phrase
that defense in ways that are independent "of the type of economy we
are talking about" and the "phase of development" in which that
economy finds itself, one which would be as relevant for Burma as for
the United States. Equilibrium prices do not imply laissez faire, and
such a defense need not preclude a substantial developmental role for
government—in the areas of saving, investing in infrastructure, stimu-
lating entrepreneurship, exercising monopolistic power in particular
world markets, nurturing truly infant industries, regulating aggregate
demand, and insuring some appropriate tradeoff between equity and
the speed and efficiency of the growth process.'5 Nor need that defense
deny that an efficient pattern of growth will entail substantial and
continuing import substitution, particularly for a large economy. It
shbuld even recognize that administrative obstacles or distributional
considerations may force a solution in which some individual prices
are taxed or subsidized to draw them away from world or domestic
equilibrium levels. But a general statement of development policy
would hold that efficiency is always "relevant" and that no rational
pattern of divergences from equilibrium prices would in any way
resemble the systematic distortions and gross inefficiences typically
introduced in the name of "structural change" through import sub-
stitution during the "growth-promoting phase" of economic develop-
men t.
J AGDISH N. BHAGWATI
Ranis is' in the happy position of having Ruggles support one half
of his paper and Eckstein support the other half. Between the two
15Theprice that will bring about market equilibrium will, of course, depend
heavily on the taxation, production, and purchasing decisions of the government.
The dependence, for example, of the equilibrium interest rate on the level of
government saving does not invalidate the principle of using the equilibrium rate
to ration capital; it does, however, suggest the wide range of policies consistent with
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discussants,therefore, Ranis has full protection from damaging criti-
cism!
The problems raised in this session are so wide-ranging that I shall
have time to focus on only a few questions. I find myself in sympathy
with what both discussants have said; but I think that they have not
drawn the issues sharply enough.
Ruggles rightly questions whether we ought to continue thinking in
terms of static allocative efficiency. He introduces the question of in-
come distribution. He also raises the important question of the impact
of the investment policies on the rate of savings. He is dead right. We
certainly can argue, at an a priori level, that if savings are a function
of the market-imputed distribution of national income, and if the allo-
cation of investments is designed to maximize current output, the rate
of growth of income might be less than if we reduced outputwitha
view to increasing the rate of savings. This familiar second-best prob-
lem from the theory of optimal growth could conceivably be of great
importance from the viewpoint of specific countries. However, we as
economists have still to ask two more questions before we rush ahead
and justify the observed departures from static efficiency in actual
practice by resort to such arguments. We have to ask whether, in fact,
the sectors to which we have redirected resources in search of higher
savings actually have these higher savings rates; and next, we have to
ask whether this shift was brought about in an optimal, least-cost
manner. I would submit that, in my experience, neither of these two
arguments is valid for many countries which are characterized by high
short-run inefficiency although I am willing to be persuaded otherwise.
I also wish to join issue with Ruggles when he feels that the waste
from inefficiency is small and has been shown by Harberger and others
to be so. Let me say, for one thing, that the mythology has grown up,
thanks to Harberger's paper, that an inherent property of inefficiency
is that it must be small. Needless to say, you only get out of your
exercise what you put in, and all such estithates are based on guesses
at production functions, etc., which are by no means better than
hunches of one kind or another. Secondly, the wastes vary with the
nature of the distortions. Waste from monopoly, in a general equi-
librium model, does not involve a consumption cost, but a tariff will:
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already an underestimate of what waste can and does occur in practice.
Thirdly, Harberger cannot have estimaEed the loss that occurs from the
kinds of distortions which result from lack of competition in sheltered
markets: the waste that takes the form of unduly high costs, failure
to improve the product in response to foreign competition that quanti-
tative restrictions (QR's) imply, etc. Finally, there is a psychological
point: Anything divided by national income looks small. A 2—3 per
cent loss of national income is a small integer but .a large absolute loss.
Besides, in relation to important and critical magnitudes such as the
annual increment in domestic investment, or marginal savings, or
foreign aid, the loss is by no means small but indeed very large.
Let me now turn to Peter Eckstein's interesting comment. While I
am in overwhelming agreement with his general description of where
things tend. to go wrong in the underdeveloped countries, I must state
forcefully that the notion that import substitution is necessarily harm-
ful is untenable. Economic philosophy swings from one end of the
pendulum to another; we are now exhorting countries to go in for
export promotion, and I predict that, in another two decades, we will
be talking of desirable import substitution and excessive export pro-
motion. In fact, we were doing that only a couple of decades ago, when
import substitution began as a conscious strategy in many countries.
"Fine tuning" is as much out of our grasp in the less developed coun-
tries (LDC's)as it is in the more sophisticated and expertise-endowed
developed countries.
While it has become fashionable to denounce import substitution
at the moment, let me remind ourselves that most LDC's do not, live in
a world where exports can be sold at given prices in indefinite amounts:
We have surely heard of the textile quotas, the pending U.S. legislation
on import restrictions, and such unpleasant things. The fact that we
have gone around calculating effective rates, costs, and benefits of
projects,etc.,at international prices, pretending to ourselves that
world prices are fixed, may itself have contributed to the general
tendency to think that after all the world is indeed characterized by
such fixity of prices and that LDC's who act contrary to such an
assumption must be import substituting out of a burst of irrationality.
The really important criticism of the LDC's must be not that they
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exportpessimism and have carried import substitution too far in some
cases, in consequence; and (2) they have gone in for indiscriminate,
high-cost import substitution, either following the policy of letting
domestic industrialization proceed under the impetus provided by
exogenousl.y imposed QR's and high tariffs or putting up industries
indiscriminately under planned programs and making it profitable by
adjusting trade policy so as to give the necessary protection to such
industry. It has become increasingly obvious that the costs from both
these sources, and especially from the latter cause, have tended to be
very high in a number of countries; and the proper focus of debate
would seem to me to be whether we can think of optimal policy frame-
works in the area of both trade and domestic investment policies which
would avoid such costs and increase the efficiency and pace of develop-
ment in the LDC's.
WOLFGANG F. STOLPER, University of Michigan
There are a number of disagreements with Gustav Ranis's presenta-
tion of the problem but, to vary the French phrase, l'accord vient en
lisant. In fact the paper seems to be written by two people. There is
Ranis the statesman and apologist, the understanding father confessor.
And then there is Ranis the economist, who really knows better, who
knows that in fact tout corn prendre n'est pas tout pàrdonncr, and who
realizes that the cost of nonsense is just too high. In a discussion, it is
proper to stress the disagreements even though in fact the agreements
dominate. The disagreements diminish with each section.
First, I regret that Ranis has in a sense prejudiced his discussion by
equating a market-oriented with a capitalist economy, and by seeming
to suggest that only in these do prices have a proper role. Even if we
had .a centrally planned economy, prices would of course be an essen-
tiál planning tool—vide "Liebermanism"—though they would (ideally)
reflect the planners' rather than consumers' preferences. Even there
they would (ideally) reflect true scarcities of factors, which of course are
affected by the planners' preferences for particular output mixes.
Prices are not an ideological phenomenon—though many countries
believe they are, and act as if they could ignore them. No priceless318 Roleof the Price Structure
economy of any complexity exists. What happens depends on what
prices happen to be, and if they are irrational, irrational things hap-
pen. Why should the absence of a "large number of entrepreneurs
sensitive to price and profit signals" make any difference? (Ranis). For
one class of entrepreneurs, farmers, it is by now reasonably well estab-
lished that they do react to price signals. But suppose there are no
entrepreneurs, and the whole manufacturing and agricultural sector is
controlled by the government. How would a planner decide upon a
steel or textile mill or anything else without reference to cost and
prices? And if he wants to increase the amount of goods available to
the economy—whether for private consumption or public investment
or education or social overhead—he still would want to avoid waste.
How could that be done without prices?
Let us also agree that the conditions of Pareto—optimality in the
static sense—are not entirely relevant, and in the dynamic sense not
easily achieved. But let us then declare a moratorium on the necessity
of such stringent conditions, let us forget the very artificial and indeed
pernicious distinction between prices as an allocation and prices as a
growth-promoting device, and let us settle for practical purposes on the
necessity to use prices and to have prices reasonably (not perfectly)
realistic (as defined above).
Ranis states:
the relevance of the price system as an essential instrument to ensure opti-
mality requires that there exist no economic necessity, e.g., because of scale or
other reasons, for government to play a substantial role in the economy's
directly productive areas, and moreover, that there exist no overriding non-
economic or ideological "necessity" to have the public sector play a more
extensive role. Thirdly, we must assume the relatively full and free flow of
information and resources,i.e.,the absence of pronounced institutional
constraints.
I find this almost totally unacceptable even where it is correct.
1. The supposed economic necessity for government to play a role
refers, among others, presumably to economics of the public utility
type, where "natural monopolies" make marginal cost pricing inappli-
cable. Now from a planning standpoint which deals with future invest-
ments, variable and fixed and hence marginal and total cost are the
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appliedto a particular existing project) to give correct answers hardly
justifies dismissing the use of prices as a planning tool. There are still
more or less rational ways to do business.
2. Ditto for .having a larger or smaller public sector. The real point
is that "ideology" has been used to "subsidize,"—i.e., to justify—an
uneconomic allocation, or to put it differently either (a) to justify the
eating up of one's capital; and/or (b) to tax the productive sectors
(usually agriculture) more and more in favor of supposed "dynamic"
sectors or "socially desirable" ends. The fact, however, is, as J. R. Hicks
remarkM a long time ago, that the satisfaction of social needs quickly
runs into the barrier of insufficient productivity. Or, as I have desper-
ately tried to put it to a minister of finance: I understand that politics
has priority over economics. I do not understand how you propose to
meet political ends without economic means. Prices are nonideological,
and the preference of ideology over economics is a confusion of ends
and means.
Since these lines were written—and I have stressed this point for
many years—Le Monde has carried a report of Le Duan's prescription
for North Vietnamese planning. Le Duan stresses the importance of
productivity and the weaknesses in project management (gestion). He
stresses that there must be planning, of course, but "dans queue
mesure utiliser les rap ports de marché, et les leviers du credit, des prix,
des salaires, du pro fitr' 1Jcould go on quoting the first secretary of
the North Vietnamese Communist party as a crown witness for my
point of view. II suffices to stress that it is completely wrong to say, as
Ranis does, that "the society must be practically and ideologically
1JacquesDecornoy, "M. Le Duan met l'accent sur 'Ia revolution technique' et Ia
nécessité de rátionaliser l'ecoiiomie," Le Monde (Paris), June 21—22, 1970, p. 5. Dc-
cornoy summarizes with numerous quotations a 200-page North Vietnamese docu-
ment. Itis somewhat embarrassing for a capitalist American to quote the Chief
Enemy. But I can think of nothing better to show that economic development is
"really" a matter of economics and that prices belong to the faits rdcalcitrants et
tétus of the economy than to do so. Since I have several times referred to the
recalcitrant nature of economic reality and since this is a highly idiosyncratic use of
the word, I wonder whether part of my royalties have come from Hanoi!
Le Duan's willingness to analyze his situation so objectively and to blame the
neglect of economics rather than the Central Intelligence Agency or even the
bombing for his troubles explains perhaps why North Vietnam has been able to
cause us so much trouble! It would certainly be better for the United States if he
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ready to accept the capitalist system as a driving force." I am aware that
political scientists sometimes argue this way. But the problem is one of
efficiency and not ideology; it is not whether an enterprise should be
public or private, but whether it produces a net output or wastes
resources.
3. Finally, the lack of infonnation is desperately real. But the con-
clusion I draw is that planners must still use prices the best way they
can. The presence of "institutional constraints" explains why things
go wrong, not that one can do without prices.
Ranis has put his finger on an important shortcoming of planning
models in general: the absence of government in influencing allocation.
But this means not that prices are less important, but only that the
models are irrelevant precisely in situations in which the government
is given a crucial role in determining how resources are to be used
against how many are to be used.
I do not therefore see just what Ranis is driving at in his implied
assertion that an efficient utilization of available resources is not in fact
"the" (his quotes) major social problem, particularly in the face of a
"frequently stagnant colonial agrarian situation," and that such role as
relative prices has does not capture the "essence" of the development
problem; which is "basically...theachievement of structural change
via a broadening of the resources base, both human and material. The
basic question...isnot how to allocate given resources more effi-
ciently, but how to introduce technological change...," etc.Pre-
cisely. Having defined the object of development to make sure that as
the result of one's resource allocation I come Out with more resources
to allocate rather than less, and with more and better choices (in my
Planning Without Facts) and .being a student of Sthumpeter, I have
never understood the problem of resource allocation in a dynamic
context to be anything else. The dichotomy made by Ranis does not
exist (except possibly on the rarified level of purest mathematical static
theory), any more than the idea that prices have something to do
exclusively with a market economy. Ranis's section I, in other words, is
a red herring.
It is a very dangerous red herring indeed. Perhaps Ranis has been
seduced by the theory of stages. He discusses in his section II the import
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"likely"to pass. But again Ranis seems to me to contradict himself.
Prices cannot be expected to create the environment for growth; there-
fore planners may have to use protection and subsidies to make pro-
duction profitable. But this simply means that the price system is
rigged in favor of certain activities. It is a kind of primitive shadow-
pricing policy.
Countries try to get rid of colonial production patterns—and more
power to them. But the colonial patterns were often (not always) main-
tained precisely by rigged prices—the French system of paying higher
than world market prices is perhaps the best example—and rigged
markets—again the French have offered protected markets to their
colonies.It should be self-evidentthat underdeveloped countries
having scarce resources must rationally allocate them to achieve their
-ends. Ranis's account shows that in fact the opposite has happened.
How did it happen? Ranis refers to Prebisch, and far be it from me
to defend him. But those of us who had thought to bypass the pricing
mechanism in favor of continuous subsidies or of decision making in
physical terms bear a considerable guilt. We complain about tech-
niques deemed, too capital-intensive, yet rig low interest rates; we com-
plain about misusing scarce foreign exchange, yet rig overvalued
exchange rates; we complain about the absence of entrepreneurs, and
let a bureaucrat produce steel with no economic sanctions and virtu-
ally unlimited access to the budget. We create institutions to break
bottlenecks, and then make it impossible for them to achieve their end
because we set up an irrational price system. To add insult to injury,
this sort of nonsense is sometimes defended by reference to "learning
by doing." Yet those of our colleagues who developed this idea never
had in mind the abuse, any more than Arthur Lewis's Industrialization
of the Gold Coast can possibly-beused to defend what passes as an
import substitution policy.
In short it is precisely the attempt to bypass prices as a planning
device—or to console oneself perhaps that they are the dual of an
input-output table—which has led to the absurd situation so well de-
scribed by Ranis. There has been no "learning by doing" because the
curriculum has been irrelevant in the absence of decent prices. Nor has
there in all likelihood been any import saving.
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controls and wrong prices (leading to windfall profits instead of out-
put), etc., is not abandoned, entrepreneurs cannot learn their business.
But it remains quite unclear just how the creation of the hothouse
atmosphere did any good in the first place. There is a Rasputin-like
quality about the argument: the more you sin, the greater the salva-
tion. But it really makes no more sense in economics than in theology,
and it can ruin economies as well as empires, ministers of finance and
planning as well as czars.
Ranis describes well what happens: "... underthe previous regime,
public and [very rarely—w.F.s.] large-scale private enterprises were the
beneficiaries in response to the actual or assumed shortage of domestic
entrepreneurship.. .." Precisely,In the abstract, the "import substi-
tution phase" is seen as a necessary period of economic violence, as it
were, to break with the past and establish a base for the future which
the next step (so well documented by Ranis as a substitution of price
signals for direct controls) is to rationalize.
But in actuality what has happened and what. Ranis has described
is really nothing of the sort. If the colonial policies, as in British West
Africa, have induced the development of a cocoa industry by small-
and medium-sized farmers, it was to the benefit of the future country—
and the absence of unjustifiable subsidies, of rigged prices, monopolies,
milking of budgets and the rest, indeed laid a sound foundation for
later stages. Where colonial policies were policies of rigged prices and
guaranteed markets, of subsidIes and exploitation, it did nothing of
the kind. The policies of import substitution as practiced—not as
envisaged by W. A. Lewis or Hirschmann—in fact continued the
colonial pattern of exploitation, of freezing the economy in inefficient
patterns, of preventing the emergenceof. entrepreneurs, whether
private or public. What difference that the color and nationality of the
exploiter changed? What difference the socialist rhetoric to which
models of indifferent academic interestgive some respectability?
Nkrumah went through over $1.75 billion. It is impossible not to do
some good while spending this kind of money. Yet the present
Ghanaian government is after ten years of Nkrumah's "socialism" with-
out foreign reserves, with a foreign debt of $1 billion, without working
capital, with a dubious endowment of fixed real capital, and has to
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Sukharnodid the seemingly impossible: He did eat up practically all
of his patrimony without noticeable benefits. In Latin America, the
industrialization policies have aggravated revolutionary situations.
The periods of import substitution had in fact not done what they
were, theoretically, supposed to do, and they could not.
So my conclusion is that the very establishment of a base for growth,
of an incipient entrepreneurial group—whether private or govern-
mental is irrelevant—requires sound price policies. (Needless to say it
requires a lot more than that, but this conference deals with price
problems). So I agree with Ranis that the problem is to promote
"growth by undoing the artificial distortions while preserving the gains
of the earlier period," while insisting that if there were any gains at all
in the "import substitution phase" they were accidental and not in-
herent in past policies.
Perhaps it would be good to add more specific uses of prices in plan-
ning. In project evaluation, the "correct" prices are evidently impor-
tant. No great sophistication is needed. The truth is that investments
will produce growth only if they are "really" profitable and if they do
not swallow up resources as hidden or open subsidies. Hence it becomes
important to estimate output prices and cost, but also timing prob-
lems, tax revenues and resources required, cash flows, etc. This links
the projects also to budgets and hence to savings which, in most coun-
tries, are prominently made a task of the government. If the prices are
reasonably correct, we can evaluate the project. If they are rigged by
tariffs or subsidies, the project can be made to look good, but by work-
ing out the budgetary implications there is a check on whether the
evaluation was reasonable. Itispossible to make any individual
project look good. It is not possible to make all of them look good
at the same time.
Practically speaking it means that one should try to overestimate
cost and underestimate revenues, and that one should be careful about
when to accede to direct or indirect subsidies which hurt the budget
and are therefore at the expense of alternate investments and/or other
uses. It is precisely this neglect that leads in Ranis's import substitution
phase to such waste.
Prices are not only signals. There must be a discipline. If prices are
improper, say for "social" reasons, it will show in the budget. Example:324 Roleof the Price Structure
In Tunisia the railway proposes an economic tariff. The government
may, for perfectly good reasons, prefer a different tariff and agree to
compensate the railway. It is a legitimate use of governmental power.
But the economist must point Out that if the subsidy had been elimi-
nated, savings would have been bigger (though perhaps by less than the
subsidy reduction).
Or, if a steel mill gets the right price it will operate efficiently. If
its prices are kept high, there will be a cost to other enterprises and/or
the government. If it is too low, there will be subsidies, or else there
will be borrowing for the wrong purposes. Instead of using resources
to augment resources, instead of finding new resources, the wrong
prices invariably reduce present and future resources. This is true no
matter what the stage of development of the economy.
Prices may change over time. Hence if there is a lag between inputs
and outputs, input prices must be current—I leave aside the problem
of replacement cost—and output prices must be the best guess of the
future. Again the stage of development is irrelevant. Some of the
Ghanaian factories can be salvaged. As for the others, if the earth swal-
lowed them, it would be the best thing that could happen. The annual
operating subsidies in some cases I know of would pay for whole new
factories, with a greater output and more employment!
I do not feel it necessary to discuss Ranis's last section. There is
complete agreement as well as the awareness, shared by Ranis I am
sure, that much more. than prices are involved in the Korean or
Pakistani performance, or that, for that matter, the last word on these
experiences has not yet been spoken. I conclude that, the distinction
made by Ranis between growth-promoting and efficiency-promoting
functions of prices is a red herring from the standpoint of develop-
ment policy (whatever may be said for it from a purely theoretical
standpoint). No one in his right mind has ever claimed that correct
prices will automatically lead to development. Such a unicausal
proposition is undoubtedly much better than explaining growth by the
method of swaddling babies, but still insufficient. But there is no doubt
in my mind that the ignorance of how prices work and the attempt to
bypass them have in fact caused the very difficulties which are referred
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leadersof the Nkrumah-Sukharno type and their intellectual tutors
than of such foreign scapegoats as are fashionable at the moment.
JACK BARANSON
The transition from Phase Two import substitution to Phase Three
export orientation can prove to be difficult and painful, as the experi-
ences of several developing countries in more advanced stages of
industrialization already demonstrate. For example, in the automotive
industry among countries of the Latin American Free Trade Associa-
tion there is already nearly ten times the industrial plant that would
be required under cost-competitive conditions.1 Once national indus-
tries have been developed behind substantial protection walls, they
are difficult to phase Out from both an economic and political stand-
point. The Japanese experience is often cited as a model of successful
transition, but both the rapid growth in the size of the Japanese home
market and the system of "administrative guidelines," which have
carefully nurtured Japanese industry toward progressive improve-
ments in industrial efficiency, are unique to Japan. Developing coun-
tries would do better to plan Phase Two and Phase Three industriali-
zation jointly, with a view toward avoiding excessive and indiscrimi-
nate Phase Two import substitution.
REPLY BY RANIS
In responding to my main critics, Ruggles, on the one hand, and
Eckstein and Stolper, on the other, I find myself in somewhat the
unenviable position of the man in the childhood fairy tale caught
between a crocodile and a lion; the only thing to do is get out of the
way. Ruggles vehemently objects to the notion that a developing
country may benefit substantially from trying to utilize the market
mechanism in support of its development effort—especially during the
second or export-substituting phase of development. Eckstein and
1SeeJack Baranson, "Integrated Automobiles for Latin America?" Finance and
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Stolper, on the other hand, just as vehemently disagree with the notion
that some deviation from the market mechanism—such as in the first
or import-substituting phase of development—may be necessary or
desirable. I have tried to make my own position amply clear, on the
basis of economic reasoning, not ideology or religious conviction. I
believe that it makes sense to distinguish between these two phases,
and that our judgment has to be sensitive to where the economy finds
itself in historical perspective.
Let me also assure Stolper at the outset that I do not view "market-
oriented" as synonymous with "capitalist"—witness the East European
use of the market mechanism. What we are all concerned with is
development in the institutional context of the so-called mixed, garden
variety of developing economy which, as a Myrdal "soft state,"is
typically in danger of suffering from the worst of both worlds. Here I
am afraid Stolper was looking for a straw man, since there is no dis-
agreement between us. respect to his more substantive criticism,
however, i.e., his questioning of the need for any import substitution
phase at all, I can only re-emphasize, as economist and not father-
confessor, the possible need for temporary distortions while major
structural change is being effected. The principal objective during this
early postindependence phase is not necessarily to have more resources
at that particular moment for immediate allocation, but to transform
such resources, e.g., people, and to provide the necessary overheads, e.g.,
irrigation contours, so that the second phase of sustained growth can
get under way. Stolper certainly would not say that the infant-industry
argument or the infant-industry entrepreneurial argument is entirely
invalid—or deny that the creation of overheads may be essential. Or
would he? What would he really substitute in place of a period of
import substitution after independence is reached? He says that "no
one in his right mind has ever claimed that correct prices will auto-
matically lead to development." But what do he and Eckstein really
have in mind? Given the initial severe colonial distortions of the entire
economy, with structure and infrastructure poorly designed for sus-
tained domestically oriented growth, what would they advocate for the
newly emerging developing society? Complete laissez faire? Eckstein
asserts that the infant-industry entrepreneurial argument favors sub-
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developmentof entrepreneurial skills. But what in fact is the best
training program for previously commercial entrepreneurs or landlords
who are having their first real experience in industrial activity?
Let me be very clear. I agree that whatever conflict between growth.
and efficiency may exist "does not justify the kinds and magnitudes of
[the] price distortions typically adopted to encourage import substitu-
tion" (Eckstein). But that is different from reading all distortions out
of the party. I would rather take my stand with Bhagwati, who pointed
out that import substitution may be necessary but that it is a question
of how far it is taken and when and how the structure is ultimately
dismantled. Surely we can all agree that departures from the market are
required to handle externalities, indirect returns, decreasing costs.
Why then is it so difficult to conceive of a purposive deviation from
efficiency to facilitate the emergence of industrial entrepreneurship
and the creation of a domestic agricultural infrastructure? One sus-
pects Stolper and Eckstein of failing to recall, whenever itis con-
venient, that earlier colonial policy had usually been one of rigged
prices, lack of spillover, lack of involvement of domestic agriculture,
and lack of generalized infrastructure beyond that required for the
exploration of cash crops or minerals for export. Can they really fail
to give any weight to the setup and learning costs of people moving
into unfamiliar pursuits and the decline of cost curves according to the
infant-industry entrepreneurial argument? We must also not forget, as
Linder has pointed out, that comparative advantage may be acquired,
at least in part, by first producing for the domestic market before one
reaches international competitiveness. Eckstein's only advice seems to
be equilibrium prices right off the bat and "independent 'of the type
of economy'. ..andthe 'phase of development' "—a prescription he
calls "as relevant for Burma as the United States."
How would Eckstein go about nurturing truly infant industries with
that prescription in mind? We can all join in our profound disap-
proval of many of the policies which have been followed in the name
of import substitution. We can also agree that the neutral version of
infant-industry protection has a better chance of separating the "men
from the boys" over time than the crazy quilt of preferences for particu-
lar industries and particular individuals which we find all too often
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particular way in which import substitution has often been carried out
in response to all kinds of vested interests—and continued in force long
beyond the point of rational application—and the basic merits of the
case, as put forward in my paper. All the countries cited by Eckstein
as examples of possible Continuous market-oriented growth as they
emerge from colonialism into independence are either relatively small
ones with an unusually strong entrepreneurial base and a small
agricultural hinterland,e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore;or an
unusually strong natural resource endowment, e.g., Malaysia; or they
don't really fit his own description, e.g., Peru and Mexico.
All in all, I cannot avoid the uneasy feeling that Stolper's and Eck-
stein's views on the role of government intervention, regardless of the
country, the time, and the quality and longevity of the tools applied,
verge on the religious. My position, on the other hand, is not that the
more you sin (in the early phase) the greater the salvation (in the later
phase) but that the need for a basic postindependence restructuring
usually requires government action. One can. then distinguish between
good and bad forms of intervention, e.g.,I believe that indirect
policies, working through the market, are better than direct policies
that rely on administrative controls; that any distortions created should
be as neutral and nondiscriminating as between industries as possible;
and, most importantly, that they should have a built-in downward
trend .over time. In my view, it is just as sinful to believe that the
invisible hand alone can solve all the problems of developing societies
as it is to believe that the visible hand of enlightened bureaucrats can
continue to manage their lives efficiently.
Turning now to Ruggies, near the other end of the spectrum, his
criticisms •are perhaps more difficult to meet, since he more or less
ignores my import substitution argument and tackles only my views
concerning the longer-run development pattern. While my Michigan
friends see red at any mention of government intervention, Ruggles
seems to have the same reaction at any mention of the market mecha-
nism. All I can do is reiterate that I clearly do not believe in the
unfettered market at work, but that the method of government inter.'
vention and the rules of the game established over time can make a
good deal of difference. If market determination would lead to unde-
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and1 would object to, let us put appropriate taxes and tariffs into
place. 1f .the market yields undesirable distribution patterns, let us use
tax and expenditure policies, including education, to ameliorate it;
but let us not fall prey to the fallacy of trying to solve all problems
directly, and thus getting ourselves into an unmanageable network of
across-the-board interventions. Otherwise, even with the best inten-
tions, the very people Ruggles is concerned about will usually get hurt.
A good example of this relates to his assertion that higher interest
rates would favor the capitalist, a situation that would offend his
egalitarianism. But the diagnosis is, in fact, wrong for all LDC's I am
familiar with. The Ruggles-proposed low-interest-rate policy which, in
fact, usually obtains, ensures that only the large, established capitalists
can get loans, guaranteeing them substantial windfall profits in a
disequilibrium situation. I am afraid I must also strongly reject, in
this context, Ruggles' view of the West Pakistan and Korean success
cases, which are cited in my paper, as simply related to devaluation. We
have had lots of devaluations across the developing world over the past
two decades, without similar results. What is esssential is the accom-
paniment of devaluation by such other measures as import liberaliza-
tion, i.e., a freeing up of the foreign exchange market, thus providing
more equal access to imports at closer to realistic prices.
It is not my position that the only role for government is to facilitate
the "working of the unseen hand." In fact, government has many func-
tions to fulfill. I am also not suggesting that the government should
take its hands off and go back to a textbook laissez faire nineteenth
century stance. Markets themselves are admittedly imperfect; private
returns do not equal social returns. The time horizon of private entre-
preneurs may be too short. The question rather is, What role should
government play in lessening the impact of these imperfections without
returning the society to colonialism or a rampant market mechanism?
In my view, that role is one of trying to bridge the gap between social
and private returns and of trying to perfect the markets just a little, by
indirect rather than direct means. In other words, once it has decided,
for one reason or another, what activities should be in the public
sector, in affecting what goes on in the rest of the economy, it should
attempt to work through •taxes,tariffs, and subsidies, and as even-
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tary rules, rather than through the low-interest and overvalued ex-
change rates and the variety of other licensing packages which are
bound to be inefficient, discretionary, and whimsical.
Just because it happens to be the conventional wisdom, there is no
need to abandon our view that government must also provide the
overheads, must see to it that markets operate better, must provide
information to ensure that weaker elements in the market are not dis-
advantaged by monopoly or oligopoly power. It must provide informa-
tion on new technologies, including intermediate technology; it must
be in a position to provide technical assistance when entrepreneurs
have little at their disposal but the blueprints of the advanced coun-
tries, and those made available by avid salesmen from abroad. Gov-
ernment cannot simply step aside and let the signals speak for them-
selves. It has a tremendous responsibility to direct the development
effort. It is merely a question of what tools are more effective for that
purpose.
It is a serious mistake to permit one's concern with the possible
excesses of the market to lead one to an acceptance of across-the-board
government intervention in its place. Neither the information nor the
civil service capacities exist—not to speak of the possibilities for veste4
interests really to go to work once the rules of the game become com-
pletely absurd. If it is not considered economically or socially desirable
to let certain industrial and civil service minority groups come into
substantial power in the course of the import substitution phase, the
best way to achieve that objective is not necessarilyimplementa
number of complicated direct controls on foreign exchange, housing,
etc., but to set substantial tariffs.and excise taxes while giving every-
one equal access to the required resources.
The crucial question to be kept in mind in this discussion, it seems
to me, is how the government can give direction to the economy while
ensuring maximum participation of its economically disenfranchised
actors, i.e., the farmer and the medium- and small-scale industrialist.
A maze of direct controls is most likely to impede the emergence of
all kinds of domestic innovative talents. Even if it is politically deter-
mined that a particular group isto be discriminated against, e.g.,
expatriate minorities in Africa or the Chinese in Southeast Asia, dis-
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ofthe market. The tail of unequal market power, in other words,
should not be allowed to wag the dog of development.
Ruggles writes as if administrative talent and the knowledge of just
what to do existed in ample supply among the bureaucracies of the
developing world. My position is that neither the knowledge nor the
ability nor the depth of talent is available. Consequently I would
rather, in this second phase, let the government do what it is best at,
i.e., set its controls in a vertical and impersonal rather than a horizon.
tal and personal fashion, and thus induce the broadest possible parti-
cipation of millions of dispersed decision makers and innovators in
all parts of the economy.